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Worrell: The Purpose of Law--A Trial Judge's View

COMMENT
THE PURPOSE OF LAW-A TRIAL
JUDGE'S VIEW
As editors we realize the extensive preparationrequisite to submitting a lead article to a law review. In the course of our solicitation
for such articles,we discovered that many practitionersand members
of the judiciary in West Virginia simply do not have the time or the
necessary research materials to perform such a task. Nevertheless,
there are many who have views as to the state of the law or special
knowledge of particularareas of the law that merit a forum.
As an example, we are publishing the text of a letter received
from the Honorable Robert M. Worrell, Judge of the Twenty-Seventh
JudicialCircuitat Pineville, West Virginia.Although unable to submit
an extensive lead article, Judge Worrell offered these thoughts as the
basis for further development in our law review by the student writers.
It is the thought of the Board of Editors that the West Virginia
Law Review should be responsive to the bench and bar of West
Virginia and should attempt to publish shorter legal writings without
being strictured by the normal requirements for a lead article. Our
intent is not to elicit responses to this particularletter or to establish
a readers' forum. Rather, we seek to make our law review available
periodically for the publication of legal writings that are shorter in
length than the normal lead article. In so doing, we hope to be of more
service to the legal profession in the State of West Virginia.
West Virginia Law Review
In July, in response to a communication from you, I agreed to
give you some thoughts which have occurred to me over the past
many years and which you might use as a basis for the preparation
of a law review article. I do not believe you can read this material
without, perhaps, reorganizing or reevaluating your thinking on some
things you have read while students in the College of Law. In any
event, I submit these rather rambling observations that did not occur
as a major revelation overnight.
The basis of all law is probably to provide for an orderly society.
An orderly society implies freedom from fear and a safe place in
which to live. The unfortunate part of our legal system is that the
courts have lost sight of this basic fundamental truth.
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In the course of World War II, while the United States Third
Army, under the command of General George S. Patton, Jr., was
driving across France, General Eisenhower became concerned about
the rapidity of the advance and called on General Patton in his headquarters. In reviewing the situation, General Eisenhower asked General Patton about his flanks, which they both knew were not secured.
General Patton's response, as I recall it, was "[s]ome stupid son-of-abitch said 'Protect your flanks', and military men have been worried
about it for centuries. Let the other stupid son-of-a-bitch worry about
his flanks. I am not worried about mine." This typical language of
General Patton contains a basic truth, and that is - simply because
somebody said something once does not necessarily make it true. What
might have obtained in a particular set of circumstances under a particular economic and social structure would be totally unrelated to
what would obtain fifty or one hundred years later, under entirely
different circumstances. The doctrine of stare decisis is used to either
justify, rationalize, or evade a difficult situation under totally different
circumstances and creates more problems than it solves.
Variance from the basic purpose of the law, rather than stare
decisis or novel legal theories presents the real problem however. This
is exemplified by the recent United States Supreme Court case of New
York Times v. Sullivan. In that case the Court held that a newspaper
had a license to comment on the life of any public person, more particularly an elected official. This new doctrine has been broadened
since that time to include law enforcement officers and almost any
person in public life. Previously malice could be presumed in libel
cases from the particular language used in the libelous publication.
That doctrine was reversed and a license was granted to make any
comment that the newspaper cared to make. Now in order for an
individual to recover for libel, he must prove actual malice. Proving
actual malice is not an easy task. The result of that decision is
simply this: A newspaper may publish defamatory remarks about
selected individuals and those individuals have no recourse. As a
result, some may resort to violent self-help because there is no effective legal right of redress for a wrong committed. Here is an example
where the Court has lost sight of basic fundamental truth.
The courts have, in the past, had long discussions in their decisions about the theory that punishment for a criminal act would serve
as a deterrent and have added to that observation the thought that
prisons should be used to rehabilitate criminals. The simple truth of
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the matter is that the public is afraid of a dangerous person. The
public is afraid of a man who will commit an act of violence on
another individual or lose control of his mental faculties through the
use of drugs or alcohol. When the fear in the minds of the public is
great enough, that individual will be separated from society and placed
in a position where society does not have to fear him any further. The
courts can talk about rehabilitation, deterrents, cruel and inhuman
treatment, or anything else that might occur to them in the preparation
of an opinion, but sooner or later they must come to the realization
that there will ultimately be in society some method of segregating
dangerous people. When they turn a dangerous individual loose because of some alleged violation of a constitutional right, even though
the individual is guilty, they are weakening the structure of an orderly
society and placing the public in a position of fearing not only a
dangerous individual but also a dangerous legal philosophy. This
may ultimately lead to an overly strong system of government that
exists in some of the other countries of the world. Incarceration of
dangerous individuals does not mean that they should be treated
cruelly or inhumanely. I believe that work for prisoners, conjugal
visits, and a fairly wholesome environment would meet with complete
public acceptance as long as the individuals are not allowed to run at
large and constitute a menace to the freedom from fear that the public
is entitled to.
If the judges of the appellate courts would spend a few days each
year with the average man in the coal mines, in the factories, or on
the streets and learn the true feeling of the average citizen, they would
find some manner of rationalization more consistent with the needs of
the public and the fears of the public. Unfortunately, they are so far
removed from the pulse of society that they are not capable of understanding the feeling of the vast majority of people that make up the
nation. No change will come about unless the attention of the law
enforcement concept is redirected to basic fundamental truths.
Robert M. Worrell,
Judge of the TwentySeventh JudicialCircuit of
West Virginia
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